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Summary 
Great claims are made both for and against the potential contribution of GMOs to the future of African 
agriculture. This paper explores this, looking at what biotechnology might mean for agricultural and food 
production systems in Zimbabwe. It focuses on two key crops, cotton and maize, and argues that choices 
about possible biotechnology futures have to be understood in relation to trends towards globalisation 
and liberalisation of the seed industry, and also shifts in the political economy of agriculture, both at home 
and overseas. Assuming that there is support for some role for agricultural biotechnology in Zimbabwe, 
and leaving aside questions of regulation, several key choices emerge, linked to four different future 
scenarios: is it best to rely on market-supply of technologies from multinational corporations? Or should 
Zimbabwe seek to develop technologies independently? Alternatively, if the latter is unrealistic, what 
scope is there for the pursuit of a middle position, striking bargains with big corporations and pushing for 
more locally appropriate forms of technology? Or, finally, are choices ultimately irrelevant with the most 
likely outcome being that transgenic biotechnology essentially passes Zimbabwe by? Several factors are 
identified that are key to these different scenarios, these include: technology choice; issues of technology 
access and ownership; the – as yet uncertain – role of new farmers emerging as a result of land reform and 
changes in the agrarian economy; the shifting dynamics of seed markets; changing industrial structure and 
ownership patterns; new economic conditions and trends in international trade relating to GMOs. The 
paper concludes that these contexts and trade-offs need to be brought more specifically into debates 
about alternative GM or non-GM futures in Zimbabwe, and elsewhere in Africa, than has happened to 
date. 
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1  Introduction 
This paper examines the challenges posed by new agricultural biotechnologies for crop research and the 
seed industry in Zimbabwe, and more broadly in the region. We focus on two crops – maize and cotton. 
Both are widely grown in both the small and large-scale agricultural sectors, and contribute significantly to 
national food and income security and foreign exchange earning potentials through exports of cotton 
products and maize seed.  
New agricultural biotechnologies – particularly transgenic products – are seen by some as 
revolutionising the seed industry and the agricultural and food production system as a whole. For the 
advocates, such technologies offer the potentials of reducing costs of inputs and decreasing the 
environmental damage of chemical dependent agriculture (cf. Wambugu 2001; DeVries and Toenniessen 
2000; Qaim 1999)1. For detractors, such technologies present potential threats to food safety, biodiversity, 
export markets and more sustainable forms of agriculture more appropriate to smallholder farmers (cf. 
Kuyek 2002a,b ; Panos Institute 2002). 
How should Zimbabwe position itself in relation to GM crops? As a small country, with limited local 
capacity for generating its own biotechnologies, independently of international collaboration and 
arrangements with transnational corporations, it is necessarily bound into a process which is far larger 
than domestic policy processes and regulatory decision making. Should it go down the GM route, allowing 
the “free market” and the big corporations to dictate the terms? Should it seek to go it alone, and develop 
its own local technological capacity independently? Or should it attempt to strike bargains and negotiate a 
middle ground that, at one time does not deny the reality of a globalised agricultural and food industry, 
where biotechnology is seen as central to future commercial strategies (at least for some major 
companies), but, at the same time, safeguards the public interest and the developmental challenges of 
poverty reduction and food security? Or should it follow a GM-free path? 
Seed industry players, consumers, producers, regulators and their representatives must respond to 
these questions, and urgently. A laissez-faire approach seems not on the cards, although, as the GM food 
imports debate highlighted during 2002, a move towards a GM option may be the default unless 
regulators are on their guard. An isolationist, go it alone, approach, despite some strident nationalist 
rhetoric and anti-GM feeling in some quarters, is also unlikely. But striking a balance is less easy than it 
might appear. Many variables, unknowns, and multiple interests and actors (some with, some without 
vocal representation) are implicated, making decisions now, and contexts for policy processes key to 
future trajectories of agriculture in the country.  
                                                 
1  In southern Africa, the main non-government proponent of biotechnology has become AfricaBio (see 
www.africabio.com), and particularly Jocelyn Webster, who focuses on public engagement and Muffy Koch, 
who focuses on biosafety training. AfricaBio, together with other well-established pro-biotech organisations 
based in Kenya – the African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum and the International Service for the 
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA), hosted a major conference on biotechnology in 
Johannesburg in 2001, sponsored by the private sector, USDA and the Rockefeller Foundation, see 
www.africabio.com/conference. Zimbabwean NGOs, most notably the Biotechnology Trust of Zimbabwe 
(see BTZ 2001; 2002), have worked closely with AfricaBio, but maintain a more neutral stance. 
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In 2001 the first field trials for GM crops were approved by the Biosafety Board, the regulatory 
authority situated in the Zimbabwe Research Council under the President’s office. This has of course 
brought into sharp focus a range of specific scientific and regulatory questions (see Keeley and Scoones 
2003). This paper, however, looks at the broader context of R and D strategy, both in the public and 
private sectors (and increasingly interactions between them), and the wider position of the Zimbabwean 
cotton and maize industry within the regional economy. The paper is an attempt, then, to spell out some 
of the strategic questions that lie behind any decisions to go the GM route in agriculture (or more 
particularly for maize and cotton). In doing so the paper analyses the implications for various actors – 
industry (both local, and multinational), producers (both large scale and communal), research and 
development (both public and private, national and international), as well as governmental regulatory 
authorities. With the changing structure of the agricultural economy following the land reform of the last 
two years, these challenges have taken on a new complexion, making the strategic challenges suggested 
here both more complex and more urgent. 
The first section of the paper sets the scene by offering a brief historical review of the maize and 
cotton sectors in the country, outlining the long history of local public sector R and D and how these 
crops are linked to a broader – and shifting – political economy of agriculture and land ownership in the 
country. The second section moves to a description of the changing structure of the seed industry, 
particularly over the last decade or so, and the implications a liberalisation of the sector has had on 
structures of ownership and control. A series of profiles of key players – both public and private, local and 
international (and, importantly, gradations between these categories) – is then offered which highlights 
how different actors view biotechnology, both as a potential and a threat. The implications of this 
positioning for the framing of debates, and the formation of coalitions, alliances and networks in the 
policy process are then discussed. The next section in turn examines how different actors view some of 
the key trade-offs in the policy debate. The paper concludes with some reflections on the possible 
scenarios for the future of biotech in Zimbabwe and some of the more general lessons learned. 
 
2  Maize and cotton in Zimbabwe 
Maize and cotton are perhaps the two key strategic crops in the country, particularly for the smallholder 
sector. Maize is the staple food for the vast majority of Zimbabweans and cotton is a significant cash crop, 
especially for smallholders (e.g. Rukuni and Eicher 1994; Mariga 1994; Mashingaidze 1994; Scoones et al. 
1996; Rusike 1998). Both crops have witnessed major public sector investments in breeding, agronomy, 
pest control and so on over the last 50 years, with major improvements in yield resulting (Hikwa et al. 
2000; Lipton and Longhurst 1989). As the former chief agronomist of the Zimbabwe Grain Producers’ 
Association put it ‘We have the top maize breeding in Africa. Conventional means have done a fantastic 
job’. But the question now is whether these achievements can be added to by applying new transgenic 
technologies, notably Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) to enhance insect resistance. 
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2.1 Maize  
As Zimbabwe’s staple crop, maize is essential to the food economy of the country. Many eat maize meals 
several times a day, and maize is the preferred grain crop in most communal areas, even those dry areas 
where it is deemed unsuitable. Since Independence maize production for sale has grown significantly in 
the communal sector, with some hailing the post-Independence boom as the arrival of an African Green 
Revolution (e.g. Rukuni and Eicher 1994; Rohrbach 1989). Maize production – both yellow and white – is 
also important in the commercial sector, although there has been significant switching to higher value 
crops in recent years. Up to 2001 the large scale, largely white-owned commercial sector was producing 
perhaps only 20 per cent of the country’s white maize requirements down from around 80 per cent at 
Independence in 1980. Until the recent land reforms, the commercial farms of the highveld in particular 
were also where most of the hybrid maize seed production occurred. This – as will be discussed below – is 
a major industry, supplying both hybrids and open-pollinated varieties (OPVs) to both local and export 
markets. 
Maize breeding has a long and distinguished history in Zimbabwe (Mashingaidze 1994; Tattersfield 
and Hovazvidi 1994). A maize-breeding programme was established in the Department of Agriculture in 
1933. By 1949 a double hybrid was released and in 1960 Zimbabwe was the first country in the world to 
commercially release a singly hybrid maize variety. SR52 was a symbol of the success of Rhodesian 
agricultural research, and the pride of the white commercial farming sector. The Southern Rhodesian Seed 
Maize Association was established in 1940 and became an important player in promoting maize growing 
among commercial farmers. The ten tonne club became a prestigious grouping of farmers able to produce 
10t/ha, and breeders in the research system aspired to create varieties that joined the club.  
The breeding material developed in this early period has continued to be the base for successful 
breeding since then. Imports of new genetic material has been important, and in recent years CIMMYT 
has been an important conduit for germplasm from Mexico and other areas across the world (CIMMYT 
2001). While breeding objectives have continued to focus on yield potentials, particularly for the 
commercial sector in the highveld where supplementary irrigation is possible, other breeding priorities 
have also emerged. Drought resistance and early maturation have been important as the hybrid maize 
sector expanded into the communal areas, and the Seed Coop variety R201 became a stalwart for many 
during the 1980s. In the commercial areas, particularly where winter irrigation occurs, disease/virus 
resistance has become a major priority in recent years. The rapid response of breeders from both 
government and commercial companies to the arrival of GLS (grey leaf spot virus), for example, has been 
witness to the effectiveness of local breeding programmes. 
However, up until now, despite these successes, much breeding remains focused on the higher 
potential areas and commercial farmers. This is where the profits have lain for the private sector players in 
the maize seed market (see below) and this is also where historically much of both public and private 
research has been focused. Despite the post-Independence rhetoric of shifting priorities to small-scale 
farmers and more marginal zones, the standard practices of government breeding programmes have 
remained largely intact. Due to the high costs of having decentralised breeding programmes, most early 
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selection takes place in Harare or Gwebi research stations which are both in areas with rich soils and high 
rainfall. While variety trials do occur across the network of government research stations the chances that 
traits which perform well in other settings will have been already selected against remains high. Although 
there have been some donor supported efforts at looking at other traits, including some potentially 
exciting options being explored by CIMMYT and collaborators (CIMMYT 2002a), the maize breeding 
and seed production industry although more diversified than before remains focused on a particular 
market. This, however, is likely to change dramatically, as we discuss below, following the land reform 
exercise of the last few years, as the scale of farms and objectives of the new farmers has shifted demand 
in dramatic new directions. Both public and private breeding efforts will have to respond too if the hoped 
for agricultural regeneration post-land reform is to be realised. 
In contrast to most countries in Africa, Zimbabwe has a very extensive use of hybrid maize varieties 
(Morris 1998; Byerlee and Eicher 1997). This in part arises from the successes of the government breeding 
efforts from the 1930s, but also due to legislative arrangements established in 1970 with the enactment of 
the Tripartite Agreement. This was an agreement – only formally repealed in 2001 – between the Seed 
Maize Association, the Commercial Farmers’ Union and Government. It confirmed that the Seed Maize 
Association would have exclusive rights to government bred seed. In 1982 the Seed Maize and Crop Seed 
Associations combined to form Seed Coop, an independent operation whose shareholders were the 
members of associations (mostly large-scale commercial farmers). The Seed Coop also had its own 
breeding programme (at Rattray Arnold Research station established in 1973) and a new variety testing 
facility was established under the Agricultural Research Trust Farm. Seed Coop retained the exclusive 
right to government bred seed (although not the ownership) and built up a formidable (and for much of 
the 1980s monopolistic) seed industry. This was based on marketing maize hybrids to a wide national 
market (both commercial and communal), and building up an export market (including deliveries to aid 
agencies for post-disaster rehabilitation packages in the region) (see Zebre 2001; Rusike 1998; Cromwell 
1996). 
This basic structure persisted until the mid-1990s. By this time Seed Coop had been privatised (to 
Seed Co), and a number of new entrants into the seed market were becoming important. Pannar – a South 
African seed house – for instance flouted the tripartite agreement from the early 1990s, establishing itself 
firmly in the smallholder maize market. From 1991 onwards a liberalised approach was encouraged, with a 
variety of local and international entrants setting up in Zimbabwe (Friis-Hansen 2000). It is within this 
liberalised context, heavily influenced by past events, that the debate about GM options is taking place. 
Gone are the days of the strong national breeding programme and a parastatal seed production and 
marketing company. Today, small, new Zimbabwean seed houses must compete with the existing big 
players like Seed Co, now with regional ambitions, and the established international companies, such as 
Monsanto or Pioneer Hi-Bred – with life sciences and biotechnology capacities operating on a global scale 
(Zebre 2001; Gwarazimba 2001). 
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2.2 Cotton 
The story of cotton in Zimbabwe has important parallels with that of maize. Cotton is seen as another 
local breeding success story, combined this time with well respected and impressive systems for integrated 
pest management techniques (Mariga 1994; Vaughan-Evans 1990). Post-Independence, the cotton sector 
has seen a rapid expansion of production in the small scale communal areas, with some areas benefiting 
from a major “cotton boom” (Worby 1992). The first cotton trial in Zimbabwe was carried out with an 
Egyptian seed variety in 1903. Later, in 1918, a cotton specialist was appointed to the Agricultural 
Department who initiated further trials. In 1923 commercial cotton production was started, but it was not 
until the 1960s that it really took off in a big way. From 1925 the Cotton Research Institute at Kadoma 
had been working on breeding locally adaptable varieties and developing pest management approaches for 
cotton (Cameron 1937). In the early 1950s Albar stock from Uganda was imported and the local breeding 
programme really took off. Being hairy varieties, these were resistant to jassid attack as well as bacterial 
blight. In 1959–60 Albar 637 was released, resulting in significant yield increases. This and other varieties 
were later adapted in four regionally specific breeding programmes established in the mid-70s (CFU-
Zimbabwe 2002b; Mariga 1994).  
Cotton breeding involves selection for a range of characteristics, and in the Zimbabwean government 
programme a total of 13 field characteristics and 9 fibre characteristics are looked at in the varietal testing 
stage. Over time average yields in the commercial sector have risen from around 600kg/ha (in 1950) to 
over 2t/ha in the 1980s. New breeding material is continuously sought from a variety of places, including 
West Africa, the US, and elsewhere in the southern African region. In all cases breeders report imported 
varieties perform less well than local ones, but some have proved useful for crossing with local lines. As 
Mariga (1994: 232) observes ‘The research work over the years has benefited from “intelligent technology 
borrowing” by importing germplasm and interactions with visiting scientists’. 
Controlling pests is a major challenge in cotton production. While breeding efforts have certainly 
helped, these must be combined with pest management techniques. In the mid-50s a system for 
insecticidal control of bollworm was developed. This was later transformed into a focused target spraying 
effort based on scouting at various stages in the season. In the early 1970s an acaracide rotation system 
was introduced, and by the late 1970s experimentation with pyrethroids was initiated. A sophisticated pest 
management system was thus developed incrementally, using a combination of farmer observation 
(scouting), selective pesticide application, rotation, and a dead period. The Cotton Handbook published by 
the Cotton Growers’ Association is the “bible” of the Zimbabwean cotton industry. The methods and 
techniques have been the basis for training and extension since the 1970s when a cotton training scheme 
was established first at the Cotton Research Institute (1971) and then at the Cotton Training Centre 
(1979). Commenting on the rigorous approach to cotton production promoted in the country, Vaughan-
Evans (formerly of the Cotton Training Centre) observes that ‘cotton instils discipline in farmers’ (1990, 
quoted by Mariga 1994).  
Unlike maize, however, cotton is produced as part of a much more integrated production and 
marketing system. Until 1997, the Cotton Marketing Board, a parastatal, offered package services to 
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farmers in cotton areas, linking the supply of high quality cotton seed to chemical supplies and direct 
marketing opportunities. A credit package ensured that the system was controlled vertically through the 
CMB. With cotton production focused in a few key areas, the opportunity for focused extension and 
implementation of regulations governing pest control measures was possible. The CMB’s efforts in the 
1980s resulted in a massive expansion of smallholder cotton production in the country. Being hand 
picked, based on quality seed and with good implementation of pest control measures  (split applications, 
regulated dead period, scouting, etc.) this was a high quality product achieving premium prices in the 
international market. 
Up until the 1990s, then, the cotton sector in Zimbabwe had seen a successful move to the small-
scale sector, supported by a state-controlled body supplying top quality R and D and implementing 
regulated control of seed quality and pest management. In addition, this was a commercial successful 
business, one of the few able to make a healthy profit out of engagement with smallholder agriculture. In 
the liberalisation era, therefore, the CMB was one of the early targets for divestment to the private sector. 
The formation of Cottco in October 1997 resulted in the creation of a strong, at that time, almost 
monopolistic business (Larsen 2001). Today, there are more players – notably Cargill, Terefin and most 
recently, FSI Agricom,2 but Cottco remains the main cotton company in the country, and, in the difficult 
times of late, has become the “darling of the stock market”, with a strong export performance and rising 
share prices even in a depressed economy.3 Unlike the maize industry, with its reliance on the large scale 
commercial sector, the cotton companies have not been hit as hard by the changes created by the land 
reforms. Indeed, the land reforms should be a major fillip for the industry, although changed 
arrangements for seed production will require a transition period. 
 
3  Liberalisation and the changing seed industry 
The post-1991 period of liberalisation and deregulation is central to any assessment of the context and 
potential role for biotechnology in Zimbabwe. As already mentioned, the main parastatals in the maize 
and cotton sectors – Seed Coop and CMB – were sold off during the 1990s. Seed Coop became Seed Co, 
with a range of investors, both Zimbabwean and international buying shares. While government retained a 
minority stake, the company operated as a private business, with a separate management structure 
independent of government. On its creation, Seed Co benefited from the exclusive rights to a range of 
important germplasm developed in the public sector over many years. Although royalty payments are due 
                                                 
2  A2 large-scale reallocated farms are increasingly being rented by holding companies such as FSI Agricom and 
CFI. Politically well-connected, FSI has an MOU with the government to ‘produce for the country to ensure 
food security’. Its cotton-outgrower scheme includes 25,000 A1 and A2 farmers, producing 60,000 tons of seed 
cotton (Zimbabwe Independent, 2 May 2003). 
3  See for example: Financial Gazette (2001). Cottco emerges as darling of stock market on ZSE. 8 August; 
Zimbabwe Standard (2002). Cottco hit by FCA suspension. 27 November; Financial Gazette (2002). Cottco gets 
exclusive rights in Mozambique. 21 November; The Herald (Harare) 2002. Cottco, TSL merger negotiations off. 
25 November; Zimbabwe Independent (2002). Money market operations boos Cottco bottomline. 22 November. 
See also www.thecottoncompany.com. However, see Oxfam (2002) for a commentary on the effect of US 
subsidies on cotton prices and production in Africa. 
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under Plant Breeders’ Rights legislation, Seed Co was quick to establish and register its own lines, and 
developed an impressive, and profitable, seed house. In the last few years, the company has extended its 
operations beyond Zimbabwe to supply seed on a regional basis in Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana. 
Cottco, the successor of CMB, again has government retaining a minority shareholding. Through a 
licensing arrangement with the government Cotton Research Institute, the company also had access to the 
publicly bred cotton varieties, although the seed production arm of the company, Quton, has more 
recently established its own breeding capacity and is awaiting the outcome of decisions on the future of 
CRI, and whether this might be taken over by the industry and incorporated into the business. 
Cottco and Seed Co are the big players in the cotton and maize sectors in Zimbabwe, dominating 
market shares of seed sales. With the acquisition of 34 per cent of Seed Co shares by Cottco in early 2003, 
the local industry is increasingly concentrated.4 But, as mentioned earlier, there have been new entrants 
during the 1990s, offering different products and entering different market niches. In the maize sector, the 
South African company, Pannar, made successful in-roads in the 1990s into the small-scale hybrid maize 
market, through intensive marketing efforts in the rural areas supplying a few good varieties. Pioneer Hi-
Bred established a base in Zimbabwe, including some breeding capacity, although it has concentrated on 
the high value market of yellow maize seed sales in the commercial sector. National Tested Seeds is a new 
company and has concentrated on open pollinated varieties, initially for export but now with the new 
acceptance of OPVs, for the local market in alliance with CIMMYT and the Crop Breeding Institute of 
the Government Department of Agricultural Research and Extension, AREX.5 
Thus across these companies, the advent of biotechnology means different things. Box 3.1 highlights 
the strategic positioning of the main players, and their (changing) ideas of what biotechnology means to 
them. 
In the cotton sector a similar story can be told. The main cotton company, Cottco, has through 
Quton, investigated the Bt cotton option in alliance with Monsanto. This whole endeavour dates back to 
1996 when an illegal trial by Monsanto was discovered at the Cotton Training Centre. This was a public 
relations disaster for Monsanto, and set back their own strategy for release of Bt cotton. Cottco/Quton 
meanwhile were keen to develop a licensing arrangement with Monsanto to insert Monsanto’s Bt 
construct into a local variety. This too was held up by government concerns over the use of local varieties 
held by the Crop Breeding Institute. In 2001, trials on Bt cotton were abandoned at the last stage 
apparently because of on-going intellectual property/licensing wrangles between the parties. Monsanto’s 
restructuring and withdrawal to South Africa also had an impact, giving a clear signal that Zimbabwe was 
no longer seen as a priority. Quton has been exploring in parallel licensing arrangements with Syngenta for 
their insect resistance transgenic technology, and, with Quton’s increasingly independent breeding capacity 
                                                 
4  The Herald (Harare) 2003. Cottco acquires 34pc stake in Seedco. 13 January. 
5  The Seed Association of Zimbabwe reported in 2001 that four companies control the maize seed market – 
SeedCo (78.7 per cent market share), Monsanto (8.3 per cent), Pannar (6.5 per cent) and Pioneer (6.5 per cent) 
(Zebre 2001: 666, quoting Gwarazimba 2001). 
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and variety ownership, there is a likelihood of new licensing arrangements developing independent of 
government. 
 
 
Box 3.1 Strategic positioning: profiles of key maize players 
 
Seed Co 
The major assets of Seed Co as a company are its germplasm, its in-house breeding capacity and its 
knowledge of the smallholder market. Pre-land reform, it had a dual market with most R and D effort focused 
on the higher potential areas and the commercial sector, with most high value products sold to this small but 
significant market. It also sold hybrid maize extensively throughout the communal areas with a high volume, 
low return strategy. Post land reform the market structure has changed, although Seed Co representatives 
report high sales of high value seed to the new A2 commercial farmers,6 and clearly there is a large potential 
for the sale of hybrid maize to the new farmers in the other “fast track” resettlement areas. Government 
purchases have distorted the true demand, but indications are that this new group of farmers will be 
important Seed Co customers in the future. Where biotechnology fits in is unclear. The company does not 
have the capacity to see through major transgenic developments on its own and has partnerships with both 
Monsanto and Syngenta. The development of Bt maize has been slow, although one Seed Co variety was 
tested in 2001 with a Monsanto Bt construct. Negotiations continue with Syngenta for a similar insect 
resistant transgenic product. 
 
Pioneer Hi-Bred 
Pioneer’s main market is in the large scale commercial sector where its yellow maizes are popular for feed. 
With its global network of breeding and product development, it can easily develop new material for this 
market. However its reliance on the large-scale commercial sector, where technologies from the mid-west of 
the US can more easily be transferred, is now questioned by the virtual disappearance of its earlier market. 
Like Seed Co its hope is that the new A2 commercial farmers will take up its products, and potentially, 
subject to regulatory clearance, transgenic products too. However this remains uncertain, and the 
commitment to see through a transgenic product development for Zimbabwe seems less likely today than a 
year or so ago. Although Pioneer tested a transgenic variety illegally on one of its stations, subsequently 
admitting this “mistake” to the regulatory authorities, it is not clear if this testing programme will continue. 
 
Monsanto 
Monsanto, in many ways, faces the same dilemmas as Pioneer. Its profitable market in Zimbabwe had been 
the large-scale commercial sector, but this now looks problematic. In 2002, the company restructured, 
withdrawing most of its Zimbabwean operations to South Africa, where the large-scale sector remains a 
significant and profitable market. In 2001, a Monsanto representative in Zimbabwe was gung-ho. He noted: 
‘In terms of maize we are set. We have a consolidated genetics. From Ciba Geigy incorporated into Carnia 
which was bought by Cargill. With the purchase of Cargill we have access to all southern Africa genetics’. But 
today, there is more reticence about entering the seed market as a main player. As the same representative 
observed: ‘Monsanto is a follower. We will make money from licensing. Our Bt product is the best in the 
world. Round up ready corn will be a major influence. It is being transformed as we speak. Conservation 
tillage will be a way of farming for all farmers’. 
                                                 
6  Under the recent land reform in Zimbabwe, two new categories of resettlement have been designated – “fast 
track” or A1 settlers (essentially smallholders) and A2 settlers who are supposed to represent a new grouping of 
“commercial” farmers. 
 9 
Thus, today, the R and D context for seed production, both for maize and cotton, has changed 
dramatically. Zimbabwe’s public sector agricultural research capacity was once the envy of Africa, but is 
now in serious decline. There has been a collapse of the public research system since the 1980s due to a 
combination of financial cutbacks, loss of staff and poor management. There is no significant public 
biotechnology capacity to speak of, at least for advanced molecular and genomic techniques (ISNAR-IBS 
1999; Falconi 1999; Komen et al. 2000). The Biotechnology Research Institute at SIRDC (Scientific and 
Industrial Research Centre, Harare) has been the main site for biotech science investments since its 
establishment (Chetsanga 2001). But, although new labs have been built and donors have backed SIRDC, 
funds, and particularly staff capacity is very limited. With the withdrawal of donor funding from the 
country of late, this has become even more problematic, and today only a handful of post-doctoral 
biotechnology scientists are in post. Other labs, such as the University of Zimbabwe or the Tobacco 
Research Board, do have some capacity for molecular biology work, but the prospects of new 
technologies emerging are limited (Falconi 1999; ISNAR-IBS 1999; Chikwamba 1996; Woodend 1995). As 
one informant noted: ‘The private sector has taken over. There is not much public sector left to think 
about publicly led biotech initiatives’. In sum, in the public sector there is neither the breeding capacity 
nor the biotech science to really contribute to the independent development of high-end biotechnologies.  
The major national asset is, of course, germplasm, protected to some degree by Plant Breeders’ 
Rights held by the government Crop Breeding Institute. However, there has been plenty of leakage of 
government owned lines to private companies over time. As someone commented, taking some breeders’ 
seed is seen as a good “retirement package” for those moving from the public to the private sector. And 
with the growth of competing private companies much new germplasm has become part of the scene. 
The major multinationals can source it globally through vast networks of breeders, research stations and 
sophisticated communication systems. For example, Pioneer Hi-Bred has only two maize breeders present 
in Zimbabwe, but over 1000 globally connected through the internet, with the ability to share digital 
photos of pests/disease symptoms, sequencing data, quantitative trait loci information and so on. The 
presence of a regional station of the CGIAR centre, CIMMYT, has changed the maize-breeding scene in 
recent years. One representative of the Commercial Farmers Union noted: ‘With CIMMYT you get free 
breeding materials without paying an extra cent. This is wonderful R and D support for the maize 
industry’. An industry breeder concurred: ‘CIMMYT’s genetic material – it’s awesome. And it’s available 
for free’. The downside noted by the same informant is that ‘it is resulting in decreased breeding effort by 
companies. This may reduce our genetic diversity and ability to respond in the future’. However, 
CIMMYT argue that their bottom line is getting good germplasm and new varieties out to small farmers. 
Alliances with the private sector must be part of this, one CIMMYT staff member argued, otherwise the 
material just stays on the station. 
Given this new context, a big question is how biotech applications might enter the local scene, were 
they  deemed  to be desirable.  Leaving  regulatory approval  issues aside  (see  Keeley  and  Scoones 2003; 
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Mohamed-Katerere 2001), what R and D alliances might deliver the new biotechnologies to the 
Zimbabwean agricultural sector?  From our conversations with the full range of players, four possibilities 
present themselves: 
 
• Public development of new technologies – through national research institutes or collaboration with 
the international agricultural research system – and licensing to commercial companies for marketing.  
• Local development of biotechnology applications by Zimbabwean or regional seed houses. 
• Licensing arrangements between MNCs and local seed companies. 
• Development by multinational companies of biotech applications and varieties as a package. 
 
At the moment the first two options look far off. The lack of public research capacity makes the first 
option unlikely, and, to date, no local company has the capacity to undertake the full development of a 
new biotech product independently. Even more basic applications, such as marker assisted selection 
(Young 1999), remain off the agenda for the time being, although some local companies are planning to 
develop such capacity as part of their breeding programmes. Thus the current trends focus on the latter 
two options, where the multinational companies hold the trump card, with access to the proprietary 
biotechnologies, which at the moment means Bt. 
The degree to which any of these transgenic Bt technologies find their way onto the market is of 
course another matter. This is dependent on a two stage process involving regulatory approval under the 
Biosafety regulations, involving at least two to three years of field trials, followed by varietal approval 
under the terms of the Seed Act, again requiring more field trials. The complexities of working out the 
terms of licensing agreements between different players adds yet another layer of complication. Thus most 
commentators in industry are circumspect about the near-future prospect. Most also argue very strongly 
that the transgenic options being pushed by the multinational life science companies are only one part of 
the story, and probably only a small part. Most involved in R and D and market development recognise 
that “good, old-fashioned conventional breeding” is going to be the mainstay of the industry for a long 
time. If this can be enhanced by such biotechnological techniques as marker assisted breeding or clonal 
selection then this is a good thing, but not too many hopes should be laid at the door of the 
biotechnology “revolution”. 
The way negotiations on transgenic technologies pan out, will depend on the viability of the market, 
the ability of local companies to hold their own, and the wider corporate strategies of the big players 
(mergers/acquisitions or strategic alliances), plus the outcome of regulatory processes, and, more broadly, 
the government’s, as yet unclear, overall stance on GM crops. What is for sure, is that the future will 
depend on wider trends of the corporate seed industry and how this develops in the region (both in 
southern Africa, but sub-Saharan Africa more generally) as well as globally, more than with the specifics of 
national governmental policy decisions (cf. Venkatasan 1994; Cromwell 1996; Tripp 2000; Zebre 2001). 
Thus policy processes and outcomes are very much linked to patterns of private sector development 
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regionally and globally. The next section look at how these relationships are being articulated around a 
series of key policy issues central to the biotechnology debate in Zimbabwe. 
 
4  Choices and contexts for the agriculture and biotechnology policy 
debate 
The future of biotechnology in Zimbabwe – and sub-Saharan Africa more generally (with the possible 
exception of South Africa) – is dependent on a number of factors. This section highlights seven of these. 
 
4.1 Technology choices 
A key question posed by many is to what degree are the biotechnologies currently on offer addressing the 
needs of smallholder African farming? For cotton, Bt may offer a solution to rising pesticide costs and 
pollution, assuming that these new constructs perform well in locally adapted varieties, that the Bt 
technology is effective against the local pest complex, that pest resistance does not become a problem and 
that an effective wider pest management system can be implemented including provisions for refugia 
(Mayer 2002). A Quton manager was upbeat about prospects: ‘We now have a large ginning capacity in 
the country. We need to ensure production is enhanced. We must get production and yields up, especially 
in the small holder sector. Biotech may help with this’. Others are more cautious, noting that cotton 
biotech was not going to be a magic bullet solution: Recalling the early rhetoric a commercial Cotton 
Growers’ Association official commented: ‘Monsanto came in and said Bt cotton was going to solve 
everything. But you can’t plant Bt cotton and go fishing for the season’. 
However, on the benefits of Bt maize, many are more equivocal. Especially in the small-scale sector, 
stalk borer infestation is not the top priority problem. As one seed company official argued: ‘for stalk 
borer the chemicals are cheap and effective for many farmers, why would they want to pay significantly 
higher premiums for genetically engineered seed?’ Issues of drought resistance and soil fertility, for 
example, are far more key production constraints than pest attacks of any sort (CIMMYT 2002b). No-till 
options with herbicide resistant (e.g. Round-up Ready) maize are also not seen to be of a high priority 
outside the commercial sector where labour and diesel fuel costs may be high.7 Thus, in many people’s 
views, the maize biotechnologies being tested are not necessarily the right ones for Africa – and certainly 
not the poorer more marginal farmers who constitute the vast majority of the population. As the 
managing director of a major local seed house put it: ‘drought tolerance, acid soils, low soil fertility are just 
not on the radar screens of the US companies . . . African [biotech] solutions are not coming in the 
medium term. We will get spin-offs from the US markets, that’s all’.  
In the absence of significant national, regional or even international public R and D capacity, the 
degree to which technologies for African smallholder settings become available will depend in large part 
on whether the industry can secure large enough viable markets to allow for upstream Africa-specific 
                                                 
7  However, this may change as labour shortages are increasingly a constraint in the small-scale sector as 
HIV/AIDS takes its toll. 
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R and D investments. If not (which given the fragmentary, imperfect, and poorly regulated markets of 
much of sub-saharan Africa seems likely), then the likely biotech applications will continue to be 
“spillovers” from R and D investments designed for the commercial farms of the Americas. Only if public 
sector science can deliver some useful products (which in the advanced biotech field at the moment looks 
way off), then will technology choices with higher priority for African producers find their way onto the 
market, perhaps through new forms of public-private partnerships such as those being proposed by the 
newly established African Agricultural Technology Foundation based in Nairobi and sponsored by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, with support from Monsanto and DuPont among others.8 
 
4.2 Technology access and ownership 
Beyond the choice of technology, issues of access and ownership are central to current debates. At the 
moment, with very limited capacity for new biotechnology development outside the MNCs, as we have 
already observed, government and local companies alike are reliant on licensing arrangements with the big 
players in order to gain access to the new technologies. Intellectual property is fiercely guarded and 
complex agreements must be reached for both research and commercialisation. In most cases any genetic 
transformation must be undertaken in the labs of the parent company, often in the US. Although no 
commercial license arrangements have been negotiated as yet for Zimbabwe, the biotech companies are 
holding out for a large share of royalties from any transformed product. For them it is the genetic 
engineering transformation where premiums accrue, and the value of the background germplasm is less of 
a concern. Those who have invested a lifetime in breeding locally adapted crops argue otherwise, pointing 
out that Bt will only perform well if in an appropriate background. As one senior industry person put it: 
‘We are overplaying one gene because it came from a lab and undervaluing the genetics that underlie it’. In 
a similar vein a senior government official commented: ‘It takes 10–15 years to develop a variety. You add 
a gene for 10 per cent yield increase. Why should they get 90 per cent of the profit?’ 
Since it is the MNCs who (largely) own the biotech constructs and the local companies who have 
access to the germplasm, many foresee some future intensive wrangling over rights and ownership, 
royalties and licenses. Indeed this has already happened, and negotiations have been fraught according to 
some of those involved, with breakdowns occurring due to lack of agreement. A cotton industry 
commentator argued ‘We would bargain for a 50:50 share at the minimum. The variety is more important 
than the Bt’. To date, as discussed earlier, only a limited number of arrangements – all pre-
commercialisation and without detailed negotiations over technology fees, seed pricing and so on – have 
emerged, with Seed Co and Cottco developing joint R and D efforts with Monsanto and Syngenta. 
The early experience of a joint venture between government and Monsanto for the development of 
Bt cotton was not a good introduction. A government official involved in that discussion recalled: ‘We 
had protracted discussions with Monsanto over Bt cotton before. Because they are owners of this gene, 
they want everything’. However, a local Monsanto manager complained: ‘The earlier joint venture failed 
                                                 
8  See Washington Post (2003) ‘Feed hungry Africans, firms plant seeds of science’, 11 March. 
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because there was no ability to strike a deal. It got bound up in sentimental issues. Government does not 
have a business frame of mind. There are still people sceptical about GMOs in government. For things to 
move there needs to be revolution in government’.  
At the moment what appears more likely is that, given the difficult relationships between private 
industry (particularly multinationals) and government, new deals are likely to be struck with local 
companies, using their own germplasm, rather than with government directly. Quton, for example, have 
begun to negotiate with Syngenta to develop cotton varieties using the corporation’s VIP technology. 
Unlike with Monsanto it appears that transformations will happen locally in Zimbabwean laboratories, and 
more appropriate licensing arrangements will be agreed.  
With these joint ventures, licensing arrangements and cooperation on R and D, the patterns of 
ownership and so control of technology development in the Zimbabwean seed sector are set to change 
dramatically. With companies increasingly keen to assure their proprietary rights over technologies 
developed at considerable cost, the implementation of patent provisions becomes increasingly important. 
The degree to which these can be upheld in the Zimbabwean context remains uncertain, and companies 
wishing to invest in biotech applications need to be assured. This uncertainty means, in many cases, that 
the technologies being offered to local companies in joint arrangements are those which are perhaps not 
the top end products offered to other markets.  
In parallel to patent protection of transformation events and biotech processes, the assurance of 
plant breeders’ rights on the background variety into which new transgenic events are inserted becomes a 
concern. While PBR legislation exists, and a thorough process of registration prior to release is in place, 
the degree to which this offsets all attempts at appropriation of locally developed germplasm remains 
questionable. Rights of farmers to their own germplasm is also another issue which has been raised by 
NGOs and taken up by government in Zimbabwe (Commutech 1998a,b; 1999). New legislation is being 
drafted currently which aims to provide protection to farmers’ rights, and would require a parallel 
registration process to those existing for varieties bred by scientists. While the desirability of protecting 
farmers’ own breeding and germplasm protection efforts is not doubted, the practicability of such 
legislation in the Zimbabwean context is not at all clear.  
With ownership and control becoming so central to the future of technology development and the 
seed sector, the question of rights – and particularly property rights – has, then, been put centre stage in 
the policy debate. This requires a sea change in the attitude to seeds and plant breeding by 
professionalised plant breeders and farmers alike. As one commentator put it:  
 
The notion of individual rights flies in the face of the way things work here. People are proud to 
share their germplasm. Look at the success of the seed fairs promoted by NGOs. Breeders can get 
good material there, especially of minor crops where there are no established varieties. And farmers 
are happy to share it. 
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4.3 The new farmers – consequences of changes in the agrarian economy 
In Zimbabwe the mainstay profit base of seed sales to the old-style, largely white commercial sector has 
effectively ceased. Most former white farms have been taken over for resettlement, transferring the land to 
a mix of smallholder farming and new commercial farms of varying sizes. The degree to which these new 
farmers will become a vibrant local market for seed sales is unclear. 2002 saw the largest ever demand for 
maize seed with 49000MT purchased, including a substantial proportion by government to support new 
farmers. In addition new farmers in the large-scale (so-called A2) schemes have been purchasing high 
quality seed from the seed houses. If the start-up transition problems of the new resettlement areas can be 
tackled, and those who acquired land but can not make use of it perhaps transferring to others, there is a 
likelihood of a growing demand for maize seed nationally. However, as with the communal areas over the 
past few years, the ability of new settlers in the smallholder “fast track” (A1) schemes to purchase high 
value hybrid seed is unclear. Instead, a greater demand for open pollinated varieties – now for the first 
time since before the hybrid revolution of the 1950s being actively encouraged by government – may 
grow. These, however, are unlikely to be the background varieties for any transgenic application (due to 
proprietary protection concerns, see above). Such products, with their potentially high technology fees and 
being based on only high quality hybrid material, will be only associated with the commercial sector, at 
least for maize.  
Perhaps the major impact of the land reform on the seed industry has been the transfer of 
commercial farms that were the base for seed production. Despite intensive lobbying of government, 
these were not retained and most have either been resettled or are subject to compulsory acquisition 
orders. The consequence has been the need for a rapid rethink of the seed production strategy on the part 
of all companies. Many have diversified their operations outside the country, making use of land in 
Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa. Within Zimbabwe, Seed Co for instance has contracted out seed 
production to new farmers on those farms previously used. While accepting that production levels and 
quality issues may be compromised, even in the 2003 production season around 5,000 ha was planted 
nearly all in new farms with an expected level of seed production of around 11,000 tonnes. With future 
investment in training and extension, the company hopes that this target can be increased to meet 
domestic seed needs. For cotton, Cottco has moved from a situation where 110 commercial farmers 
provided nearly all the cotton seed for the company to one where only nine of these farmers have 
continued cotton seed production and this has been contracted out instead to a network of around 15,000 
smallholders, all with a long-term association with Cottco, across the country. Unlike maize, of course, 
where isolation distances and a more complex production process is required, cotton is certainly more 
amenable to small-scale seed production, but nevertheless this is a major shift for the company requiring 
compensatory investments in a range of support services for the new seed producers. 
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4.4 Seed markets 
Much of the discussion about the pros and cons of GM crops may be purely academic if there is no 
market for high-end, transgenic biotech products. Clearly the bigger seed companies and biotech majors 
believe there is a market out there, but this is by no means sure. Understanding the local market is of 
course key to business success and central to any targeted R and D strategy. And, as we have noted, this 
market is fast changing in Zimbabwe with a whole new client base in the new farms created following the 
land reform. A local industry person observed: ‘The big technology companies have a large farmer 
mindset. They think the market here looks like the US, Argentina, Australia. It doesn’t’. In Zimbabwe the 
successful seed houses very consciously divide their market between a low volume, high quality, large 
margins market in the large scale commercial sector and a high volume, lower quality, small margins 
market in the communal sector (McCarter 1998). A seed house MD pointed out: ‘We sell seed like soap, 
sugar or coke. It is not like the US where salesmen trail around’. 
This applies elsewhere in Africa, but perhaps with an even greater reliance on a disparate, poorly 
organised small-scale sector, where margins are low (with the obvious exception of South Africa which 
has maintained a large-scale commercial maize sector, and a few other countries such as Zambia and 
Mozambique which are trying to galvanise one). The degree to which a top end biotech product with a 
significant technology premium (some estimate up to 10 per cent) can be sold on to this sector is very 
uncertain, even if the benefits exceed the premium.  
There are other practicalities also. A local seed industry commentator asked: ‘Do you think for a 10kg 
bag of seed sold in a remote rural store every farmer is going to fill out a three page license agreement?’ 
Beyond licensing arrangements required, broader regulatory approval may present hurdles for investment. 
As one commentator put it:  
 
The costs of regulatory approval in the US for one biotech product are as much as the profits of the 
whole private sector seed industry in Malawi. They are not going to invest under such a situation. All 
we can hope for is a spillover from South Africa where there is a decent market. 
 
With poorly developed credit markets, and low capital availability among smallholder farmers, the option 
of buying relatively expensive premium grain seed is available only to a few. As one industry sceptic put it 
‘Bt will double the price of seed. This is impossible in the small-scale market. And high input commercial 
farmers are only 2 per cent [from 2002 even less] of the entire market’. While the experience of 
Zimbabwe’s hybrid maize farmers is used as a counter argument, this may be a peculiar example. While 
such farmers may well fully appreciate the value of the new product, just as they have appreciated hybrid 
maize, they may not be able to afford to use it except on certain portions of their farms in certain seasons 
(or under irrigation). This may not be a very big market, and so will act to decrease the incentive for any 
company to invest in new R and D, even if aiming for a product with greater market potentials. In South 
Africa for instance hybrid maize seed can sell at US$2 per kg, in Zimbabwe it would only be 20 cents in 
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the smallholder sector. The margins are thus significantly different, and there is no possibility of charging 
the South African technology fee of 80 cents per kg for Bt products to Zimbabwean small-scale farmers. 
The cotton sector, though, may be somewhat different. Here production is often focused in 
particular areas, with a close developed between production and marketing, often overseen by a single 
company. In the case of Cottco, for example, an input package is supplied and a guaranteed sale channel 
offered to producers. This has allowed cash-starved smallholder farmers to acquire the necessary inputs 
and successfully grow cotton on a significant scale. With such a structure the possibilities of supplying Bt 
cotton seed with a premium price may be more feasible than in the maize seed market. Monsanto point to 
the “success story” of Makhatini in South Africa as an example of the rapid uptake of Bt cotton seed, with 
farmers reaping significant economic gains (Ismael et al. 2001a,b; Kirsten and Gouse 2002; Buthelezi 
2001). 
 
4.5 Industry structure and ownership 
A pattern repeated in many parts of the world has been a rapid consolidation of the seed industry around 
a few major players. A local seed house manager commented: ‘If you are not in bed with the right people 
now, you are not existing in the seed market’. To date the process of consolidation has been slow in 
Zimbabwe, and similarly elsewhere in the region. But will this remain the case? People we talked to were 
fairly uniformly convinced that consolidation – either through direct take-overs or increasingly tight joint 
ventures or linked licensing arrangements between local players and major MNCs – was the future, 
although the time frame over which this would happen was less clear.  
Companies like Seed Co, with a traditional national state-owned seed house origin, have been 
expanding significantly in recent years, diversifying their operations and acquiring stakes in companies in 
many nearby countries.9 They argue that, without a region-wide base, the chances of survival in a small 
market with a volatile and uncertain economy like Zimbabwe is slim. The windfalls of aid support for seed 
packages (for Angola and Mozambique, for example) in recent years have been important injections for 
many companies producing open pollinated maize varieties, but as a stable base for the company these 
opportunities cannot be relied upon.  
Given the current state of the Zimbabwean economy and the uncertainty created by the current 
political turmoil, it is unlikely that major take-overs by MNCs of local firms will occur in the immediate 
term. However, the recent acquisition by Cottco of 34 per cent of Seed Co’s shareholding is an indication, 
that, at least locally, the trend towards consolidation is continuing.10 The combined R and D, seed 
production and marketing efforts of Cottco/Seedco may present a formidable local and regional company 
that may be able to stand up to and even compete with the bigger international players. 
                                                 
9  See for example: Daily News (Harare) (2002). Mozambique accepts Seedco hybrid seeds. 29 April; Daily News 
(Harare) (2002). Poor performance threatens Seedco’s regional position. 19 November; Zimbabwe Independent 
(2002). Brokers trim Seedco forecasts. 11 October. See also www.seedco.co.zw 
10  The Herald (Harare) 2003. Cottco acquires 34pc stake in Seedco. 13 January. 
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4.6 Economic conditions 
The current economic crisis has seen the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar, and the development of a 
strong parallel currency market, where the US dollar trades at 200 times the “official” rate. This makes 
conducting business very tricky when exchange rates have to be calculated across multiple levels. A 
substantial devaluation of the dollar will certainly make Zimbabwean products cheaper internationally, and 
for exporters this may result in increasing competitiveness. However, the downside may be continued 
rising inflation (estimated at 175 per cent in early 2003 and expected to rise to up to 500 per cent pa) and 
increasing costs of imports. This is of course particularly problematic for local companies trading in 
Zimbabwe dollars. By contrast multinationals, with access to hard currencies can weather the storm, and 
indeed profit by it on occasions. But perhaps more than the specifics of exchange rate fluctuations, 
inflation and devaluation it is the uncertainty created by such a depressed economy that makes doing 
business in any sector a difficult challenge, particularly for local companies without the scale of a 
multinational corporation to offset risks. 
With the current food crisis stretching government resources to the limit and with aid flows to 
Zimbabwe having dried up in 2002–3 due to a variety of sanctions against the Mugabe regime, the 
prospects of substantial amounts of money – if any – being offered to public sector R and D in agriculture 
are remote. Even before the politically motivated sanctions the non-payment of past loans meant that the 
government has been blacklisted by the World Bank/IMF. The result was the cancelling of proposed 
loan-backed public investments in agricultural research, and a dramatic decline in project based funding 
for public sector biotech work. While some funds trickle through on the back of regional projects, 
international networks and individual grants and fellowships, significant support for capacity building, 
infrastructure development and basic research in the biotech area have been put on hold. While this may 
be a temporary phenomenon, the slow development of biotech capacity in the country has been 
undermined. Returning PhD graduates find labs without equipment and resources, and, unsurprisingly, 
they seek alternative options outside the country. The combined consequences of economic slowdown 
(with high inflation and declining real wages in the public sector) and lack of top up aid money has meant 
that the attractiveness of a public sector career in science (particular biotech science with such 
international demand and an eager private sector willing to pay significantly higher salaries, often in 
foreign exchange) has declined dramatically.  
Thus, despite the impressive commitment of a few key leaders, the prospects for a revitalisation of 
public sector research in the near future is slim. The relatively limited international public funds in this 
area seek out countries where there is a better combination of economic and political stability and a more 
concrete commitment to biotechnology from government. In this regard Zimbabwe has lost out to Kenya 
in the last few years which, through the advocacy of heads of the national agricultural research system 
(KARI) and alliances with biotech industry (through ISAAA and others) have presented themselves as 
sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural biotechnology leaders, much to the chagrin of Zimbabweans working in 
this field. 
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4.7 International trade and GM choices 
The final factor we wish to highlight – that of the impact of international trade concerns on GM options – 
has come to particular prominence in the Zimbabwean context in the past year or so. With Zimbabwe 
being GM-free at the moment, what are the consequences of going down a GM route for trade? A 
number of concerns have been raised. During 2001, it was beef ranchers in the large-scale commercial 
sector who were raising concerns through their Commercial Farmer Union commodity association (CFU-
Zimbabwe 2002a). Would EU markets accept Zimbabwean beef, if feed became GM? The (pre-Foot and 
Mouth outbreak) EU market was considerable, valuable and protected. Grain producers also raised 
concerns, as some of their products might no longer gain GM-free status (e.g. exports to South Africa for 
baby food). Cotton producers did not seem to worry as much, as their exports were largely high quality 
lint and so not for consumption, while all edible products of cotton production (oil, seed cake) are 
consumed locally. Other producers have also raised concerns, including those involved in the horticultural 
trade where a GM-free, if not organic, premium can be raised in certain export markets. 
These concerns, while discussed, only became a really hot issue when the importation of GM food 
aid was being mooted. As many surmised, an uncontrolled importation of whole grain maize for food aid 
could quickly result in the country being viewed as a GM producer due to informal planting, even before 
any formal commercial releases were granted. Thus in the debates surrounding food aid imports, trade 
became a key touchstone. With the pressure heightened by the US, many feared that the GM food 
imports would be simply commercialisation by the back-door, without due attention to the procedures of 
the regulatory process.11 Despite assurances from the EU and others that GM feed would not prejudice 
beef markets and that particular transgenic events were not covered by the moratorium in Europe,12 
people were sceptical. This looked to many as a set up job, with a heavy-handed trade imposition being 
handed down in the guise of humanitarian aid. In the end the Biosafety Board rule that GM maize could 
                                                 
11  For both international and Zimbabwean press commentaries, see, for example: IPS, Inter-press service (2002). Die 
of hunger now or eat and die later. August 26; IRIN (2002). Zimbabwe: GM maize accepted as crisis deepens. 6 
September; Reuters (2002). Starving Africa should accept GMO food, US says. 29 July; Reuters (2002). US calls 
food aid refusal a crime against humanity, 9 December; SciDevNet (2002). African hunger and GM maize. 
www.scidev.net/archives/editorial/comment28.html; The Economist (2002). Better dead than GM Fed. 
Economist, 23 September; The Independent (UK) (2002). US policy on aid is “wicked”, Meacher. 1 December; 
UK Independent (2002). Row grows over GM food aid for Africa as 14 million starve. 19 October; Washington Post 
(2002). Starved for food, Zimbabwe rejects US biotech corn. 31 July. For a flavour of the US position, see: US 
Department of State (2002). Zambian rejection of US food assistance. Statement by Richard Boucher, 
Spokesman. Press release, 30 October or USAID (2002). Confusion on biotech affecting famine, trade, official 
says. USAID press release, 16 December. www.usaid.org UN agencies, including WFP, WHO and FAO were 
under intense pressure to follow the US line. See for example statements: WFP (2002). WFP policy on 
donations of foods derived from biotechnology (GM/biotech foods). Agenda item, 4. Policy issues. Executive 
Board Third Regular Session, Rome 21–25 October. WFP: Rome; FAO (2002). Director General urges 
countries to think carefully before rejecting GM food aid. FAO Press Release, 30 August. FAO: Rome. 
www.fao.org/english/newsroom/news. Also: Agence France Presse (2002). WFP grapples with GMO 
dilemma in southern African food crisis, 24 July; AllAfrica.com (2002). WHO urges acceptance of GM food 
aid. 28 August. See also GRAIN (2002), Greenpeace (2002), Fakir (2002) for critical commentaries on the US 
position. 
12  Berglund (2002). EC clarifies its position on GMOs. Press Release, Lusaka 28 August. Delegation of the 
European Commission: Lusaka. 
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be imported as aid, but only if milled in advance or immediately after entering the country (see Keeley and 
Scoones 2003). 
With the changing structure of farm ownership and land unit size, the possibilities of aiming for a 
segregation scenario was also looking increasingly problematic. Certainly for maize, but perhaps less so for 
cotton where there are only two varieties and a highly controlled production-marketing-ginning system. In 
the past some Commercial Farmers’ Union representatives argued that segregation for all crops was the 
route to go, with careful tracking and separation of GM and non-GM products, and isolation distances 
between different crops being maintained. In the large-scale sector where farm sizes are huge, production 
and marketing chains tight and on-site monitoring feasible, this option looked like a possible compromise, 
where niche markets could be maintained depending on consumer and regulatory preferences in export 
countries. However, seeing this through in the new post-land reform situation is far from clear, only 
adding to the view expressed by one industry informant who said their approach was to: ‘wait and see 
what the government decides. And this will only happen when the US and EU decide’. 
Thus, in the policy debate on GM seeds, it is not only the national context that matters. The ongoing 
tussle between the EU and the US casts a strong shadow on national decision-making and commercial 
options. This trade dispute, then, is being played out in southern Africa through (implicit and apparently 
otherwise) threats over aid flows and broader trade relationships. It has also entered the dynamics of 
response and the intense politicisation of an international humanitarian response to a major regional food 
crisis. The future of biotechnology choices in Zimbabwe, therefore, are very much wrapped up in a global 
contest between industry, governments and consumers, often far removed from the poor, smallholder 
farmers that this technology is supposed, according to the pro-biotech rhetoric at least, to benefit.  
 
5  Future scenarios 
During our discussions of these themes with a range of actors in Zimbabwe, four broad scenarios of the 
future of agricultural biotechnology and the seed industry were talked about. Told as stories, these create a 
series of policy narratives, each associated with a set of framing assumptions, and linked to a network of 
policy actors. No-one believes any one of the storylines will become reality in as neat and tidy a way as 
they are told, but the narrative provides a justification for action, and an umbrella for the development a 
coalition of players interested in promoting a particular policy trajectory. 
 
5.1 Scenario 1 
The private sector can make money from the small-scale sector in Africa. In Zimbabwe for instance 
35,000 tons of hybrid maize seed were sold in 2001 and 49,000 MT in 2002, mostly to small-scale farmers, 
a figure higher than the whole of South Africa. If farmers in Zimbabwe can recognise the value of 
improved technologies and pay for it, then why not, so the story goes, in Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi 
and the rest of the region? With farmers already showing long-term commitments to new technologies, 
with widespread recognition of the benefits, why would they shy away from biotechnologies, and Bt maize 
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or cotton in particular? The case of the widespread adoption of Bt cotton on the Makhatini flats in 
Kwazulu Natal in South Africa shows the potential viability and attractiveness of Bt technologies. A 
liberalised, but well regulated, market is the route for private sector investments in a range of joint 
venture, licensing and other arrangements. MNCs will be key in bringing the benefits of new technologies 
to Africa’s poor, but only in conjunction with solid conventional breeding programmes to provide good 
quality background material, it is argued. A restructured seed industry, with take-overs of inefficient state 
run enterprises, and joint initiatives with local private players, will deliver the results. As markets develop, 
new products will come on line spreading the gains of an engagement with a global industry to the 
smallholders of the region. 
 
5.2 Scenario 2 
An increasingly consolidated seed industry with MNC domination (at least at the biotech end) will reduce 
choices. Seed markets will become entrapped in broader needs to recoup R and D costs on global biotech 
investments. With shrinking markets elsewhere (due to regulatory hurdles, public disquiet over GM etc in 
Europe for example), Africa becomes critical to the global ambitions of the biotech industry. Making sure 
that Africa goes GM is a key part of company strategies (and by extension US government policy), as this 
will ensure that there will be fewer and fewer non-GM zones globally, putting pressure on the Europeans 
to come into line. Thus, for the long term, accepting Africa as a loss-leader makes good business sense. 
This is why such companies may accept lower technology fees and small returns. However, control of the 
industry is a key objective. Aggressive take-overs of local firms will tend to reduce choice and remove R 
and D from local settings towards generic products developed for bigger markets. New contractual 
arrangements will entrap farmers into a particular set of obligations (linked to credit, marketing and 
seed/technology use agreements) through the growth of contract farming/out-grower arrangements to 
ensure that markets are created. This will divert R and D investment from conventional breeding and 
squeeze out competition in the seed market, driving input prices upwards, even if some costs come down 
through the new technologies.  
 
5.3 Scenario 3 
Public sector research investments on a regional basis, linked to international organisations must increase 
to deliver the type of biotechnology products that farmers really demand. Simple market mechanisms will 
not deliver this. Agreements on intellectual property (IP) transfers will have to be made with commercial 
companies in order to secure access to technologies and processes for this research, however (as 
envisaged by the African Agricultural Technology Foundation). These may be available for non-priority 
crops (e.g. sweet potato, cassava etc.), but probably not for maize or cotton. However, for these crops, if 
public research invests in traits that the major MNCs are not interested in (such as drought tolerance or 
responsiveness to poor soil fertility), then deals may be made with the MNCs for the development and 
marketing of products to markets that, while they are not their priority, will potentially extend their market 
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share. Concerted investment in public sector research, then, is a key priority, and should be focused only 
on areas where the private sector big players have no major interests. This is a longer term project which 
must be started now to ensure food security for the poor.  
 
5.4 Scenario 4 
Agricultural biotechnology – and in particular transgenic crops – will be a commercial flop in Africa, even 
in somewhere like Zimbabwe with the tried and tested hybrids market for maize and the long tradition of 
using purchased seed for cotton. Markets are thin, producers are poor and the product available will not 
be attractive to those without significant capital assets and buffers against risk. With increasing number of 
rural people suffering increasing levels of livelihood vulnerability, and with less and less ability to raise 
cash and take risks, the market for biotech products will be minimal. The changing patterns of input 
purchase (improved seed, chemicals, fertilisers) in Zimbabwe is a key indicator of this trend. The ability of 
commercial companies to operate a successful regional seed market north of the Limpopo will continue to 
be constrained by both the scale and diffuseness of the market, high transport costs and diverse national 
regulatory regimes. In addition, continued domestic and perhaps more significantly international worries 
about biosafety of GM products will mean that biotech applications will concentrate on the low-tech end 
– tissue culture and marker-assisted selection, for example – where regulatory concerns are negligible, and 
there are no worries about export markets. This will be compatible with continued public sector 
involvement (such lower end biotechnologies are cheaper and less bound by intellectual property 
protection) and local commercial enterprises (for the same reasons, and perhaps in alliance with public 
sector players, and international organisations) may be able to make a go of it. 
While not articulated fully, or with such certainty, elements of each of these scenarios were related to 
us in interviews by different policy actors. Some confidence in the private sector solution (scenario 1), not 
surprisingly, was presented by MNC representatives, and with a degree more scepticism by larger local 
seed houses (although they saw conventional seed markets persisting without biotechnology, and 
biotechnology simply as one element of a larger portfolio, including open-pollinated varieties).  
The pessimistic vision (scenario 2) was also relayed by some in the seed industry, who foresaw a 
rather limited future for the local/regional seed industry as currently constituted. Outside South Africa, 
the challenges of developing effective, regulated seed markets was seen as limited, and the prospects for 
MNC domination high. Take-overs, they thought, were almost inevitable, with local operations 
concentrating on niche markets where the scale advantages of MNCs were not apparent. A similar 
scenario, although with a different political spin, was painted by some NGO representatives and 
government commentators. Seeing limited potentials for national leverage given the broader policy of 
liberalisation this scenario was seen as likely, with major negative consequences for the seed industry and 
agriculture more generally. 
Some in this grouping, however, added a more positive view, although one that might arise in the 
medium to long term. The conditions for this, though, were seen to be at present unlikely – essentially the 
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availability of significant public funds sourced internationally, and a mechanism for regional coordination 
of research efforts (scenario 3). More likely, these commentators, pointed to the final scenario which 
foresees a low-tech biotech future, where public and local private sectors would both have a role. 
What scenario – or more likely combination of scenarios – will ultimately emerge will depend on the 
type of policy issues, contexts and trade-offs highlighted earlier. It is around these themes that public 
policy debate needs to develop, both in Zimbabwe but also in Africa more generally, in ways that are more 
sophisticated and nuanced than the current slanging matches between pro and anti-GM lobbies. The 
outcome may well be highly differentiated – for different crops, agro-ecological zones, socio-economic 
groups of farmers, and countries with contrasting economic structures and patterns of trade relations, the 
choices will almost certainly be different. But for the future of African farming, and particularly that of 
smallholders, an engaged and informed debate is vital. We hope that this paper is a small contribution to 
this debate. 
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